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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BENJAMIN HAMPTON
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

MARION H. ROWLEY and
NORMA RO\VLEY, his wife,
dba ROWLEY BUILDERS
SUPPLY
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9050

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND
RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of an ac'tion for persona'!
injury brought by Benjamin Hampton against
Marion H. Rowley and Norma Rowley dba Rowley
Builders Supply. Mr. Hampton fell while carrying
a bag of cement down the steps in front of a build·
ing at defendants' place of busine~s. the fall allegedly resulting from a rock on the step. ( R. 1, 2, 3).
The case was 'tried and the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff,
No Cause of Action. (R. 137, 138). It' is from the
Judgment on the Verdict that this appea'l is taken.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff gives a short statement of fact in his
brief, but we are not in accord with the facts as set
forth, and plaintiff failed to give all the pertinent
facts.
Saturday, March 29, 1958, at approximately
1:15 P.M., the plaintiff was 'trying to locate a hardware store that was open, so he could purchase some
cement. He drove tD the defendants' place of business at 4300 South 9th East Street, and it was
closed, it being Saturday afternoon. (R. 6-33-34).
Defendants' place of business consists of two Army
type barracks buildings located on the west side
of 9th East, the buildings being separated by a
driveway leading intD the business supply yard. The
south building was not being used in the business,
and it had been remodeled into an apartment in
the front, and was occupied by Mr. Rowley's father,
Wilford Rowley, a gentleman 76 years of age, who
was retired and a widower. (R. 17-23~24~28). The
defendant, Marion Rowley provided his father with
the apartment, and Mr. Wilford Rowley was not
employed and did not work for his son, having quit
work about one and one half years previously, and
he had a heart condition that restricted his activity.
(R. 28-30-31).

The plaintiff went up the steps to the front
door of the south building, and found it locked.
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He had observed Mr. Wilford Rowley moving the
curtains, and knocked at the door, and Mr. Rowley Sr., answered the door. (R. 63). Plaintiff was
told the place of business was closed, but he wanted
some cement, and Mr. Rowley Sr., told him he could
get some cement but there was no one there who
could carry it out, and plaintiff was told he would
have to carry the cement out himself. (.R 35, 3461, 62, 63). The cement was available by going
through the south building to some storage boxcars
in the rear. Plaintiff carried one bag of cement to
his trailer, went back and got a second bag, and feU
while descending the steps with the second sack.
{R. 36). After the faliJ he rested five or 'ten minutes
then went back and got the third sack of cement,
loaded it on his trailer, went home, mixed the cement, went out and got more gravel, and then had
to quit work on the job he was doing because of the
ankle swelling and paining. (R. 40).
The defendants' place of business is located
about 22 feet west of the west line of 9th East
Street. (R. 13). There is a graveled shoulder on 9th
East Street and defendants had gmveled the area
in front of their place of business tD keep it from
getting muddy. (R.19-20).
In front of the south building there was a concrete apron about four feet in width, out from the
bottom step of two steps leading into the bui1ding.
The first step was three inches above the concrete
3
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apron, and the second step was six inches above the
first step, and the building floor leve'l was six and
one half inches above the second step. (R. 21, 80,
81, 82). Exhibits P-1, 2, 3 and 4 show the general
nature of the steps and area.
Plaintiff contended there was a rock on the
first step and that he stepped on the rock while
leaving the building with the second bag of cement,
and it caused him to fall. Although plaintiff contended that the rock was on the first step, he testified on cross examination and at deposition, that
he had taken but one step down from the building
floor level when he fel'l - that he fell as he stepped
down from the flool' level. (R. 36, 65, 68, 73). The
rock was about the size of a quarter and he observed
it on the first step aiter the fall. He never observed
any rocks or gravel on the steps the first and second
time he entered the building, or the first time he
left the building with the cement. (R. 66, 72, 74).
The rock on the step, alleged by plaintiff, was
larger than the gravel on the ground and on the
cement apron in front of the steps. (R. 38, 72).
There is no evidence in the record as to whether
the rock which caused p'laintiff to fall was of the
same type and nature of material as the gravel
fill, the only evidence being that it was larger than
any of 'the other gravel material in the area in
front of the store and on the cement apron. (R.
38-72).
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY IN INSTRUCTION NO.

ll~A.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY IN INSTRUCTION KO. 11-A.

Plaintiff admits that the instruction given by
the court is a correct instruction as to the elements
necessary to hold a possessor of property liable to
a guest or business visitor, but contends that this
case is an exception to the rule of law set forth in
the instruction. Plaintiff makes the bald statement
that the mere fact 'that the defendants had put some
gravel on the ground in front of the p1ace of business created a dangerous condition, intentionally
and voluntarily.

Reading of the plaintiff's brief fails to reveal
any case, text book aUthority or any valid argument
that pea gravel spread upon the ground creates
and makes a dangerous condition. It is common
knowledge that driveways, road shoulders, playgrounds and areas in front of buildings, schools,
service stations and other places too numerous to
mention, are graveled, to keep them from being
muddy, dusty or rutted.
From the undisputed facts, the al'leged rock

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the step was larger than the gravel in front of
the building. There is no evidence in 'this record
that the rock allegedly on the step was of the same
or similar size, color or nature as the pea gravel
on the ground in front of the building.
The rock was on a step - not on the apron not on the ground. The defendants did not gravel the
steps, did not put :rock or gravel on the steps. The
rock, even if it had of been placed in the area
graveled, could not have jumped, flown, or moved
in any way onto 'the step, be it the first or second
step above the cement apron.
Plaintiff Claims comfort from the decision of
this court in the case of DeWeese v. J. C. Penney
Company, 5 Utah 2nd 116; 297 P. 2d 898, contending 'that the case now before the court is within the
principle announced in the quoted case. The opinion
of Chief Justice Crockett sets forth the fundamental
rule of law applicable, and the opinion states:
"(b) Defendant's negligence.
"The essential inquiry relating to defendant's
negligence is \Vhether in performing its duty
of due care just recited, it knew or sMuld
have known, that a dangerous condition existed and whether sufficient time elapsed
thereafter that, in due care, it should have
put out the mats or sprink1ed feldspar on the
surface to reduce the slipperiness." (emphasis
ours)
In the very case plaintiff quotes, and in which
6
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he claims to find succor, the court announces that
the essential inquiry relating to defendant's negli~
gence is whether in performing its duty of due care
just recited, IT KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN that a dangerous condition existed.
Judge Faux, in instructing the jury, Instruc~
tion 11 A, submitted that essential inquiry to the
jury for determination, did the defendants kno·w, or
shMtld they have known, that a danger<ntB condition
existed. The portion of the instruction of which
plaintiff complains was correctly given, and was a
correct and essential part of the ins'tt·uction.
In the DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co. case, it
was admitted that the company knew the 'terrazzo
was slippery when wet, and on 'the day of that
accident the terrazzo was wet, and therefore the
elements in the case as to the dangerous condition,
wet terrazzo, was known to the defendant, and thus
that defendant did know of the dangerous condi~
tion.
In the case now before the court, there is no
evidence that defendants knew of the rock being
on the step, or that any rock had ever been on the
steps. The court correctly submitted to 'the jury the
question as to whether the defendants knew or
should have known the rock was on the step.
Defendants respectfully submit that this case
is more within the principle ennunciated by the
court in the case of Maxine D. !Andl'lay v. Eccles
7
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Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 364; 284 P. 2d 477. In
that case the plaintiff slipped and fell on some water
on the floor in the Coffee Shop of the Eccles Hotel.
The wai'tress had delivered some water to the plaintiff but there was no evidence as to how the water
got on the floor, by whom it was deposited, when
it got there, or that defendant had any knowledge
of its pl'esence, and the court, in upholding the trial
court's directing a verdict in favor of the defendant,
said, that under such circumstances, a jury cannot
be permitted to speculate that the defendant was
negligent.

Defendant t'espectfully represents to the court
that the l'ecord in this case is barren of any evidence
as to how the rock got on the step, by whom it was
deposited, when it got on the steps, or that defendants had knowledge of its presence.
Defendants contend that the circumstances of
the rock being on the step are equa1ly consistent
with non-negligence as with negligence, and under
the doctrine announced in the cases of Jackson v.
Colston, 116 Utah 295; 209 P. ~d 566; JenMn v.
S. H. K1·ess Company, 87 Utah -J34; 49 P. 2d 958;
and Qt•i!ln \'. Ptnh Gas and Coke Company, 42 "Ctah
113; 129 p 362.
In the case of Hat::.:is v. l'nitcd States Fuel
Compony, 21 P. 2rl 862, 82 Utah 38, a case involving dynamite caps in a house leased by defendant to
8
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the plaintiffs, and the son of the plaintiff finding
the caps and suffering injury, the court said that
there being no evidence in the record proving or
tending to prove that the defendant either stmed
the caps in the place or knew that they were there,
that the evidence was not sufficient to make the
defendant liable for the injury.
Plaintiff quotes to the court the case of Falcone1·
v. Safeu:ay Stores Inc., 49 W. 2d. 78; 303 P. 2d 294,
but defendants submit that the case is not applicable.
In that case the defendants knew of the suet on the
sidewalk, and had actually placed it there. The
defendants knew of the suet being on the sidewalk,
admi'tted1y having put it there, and so the question
as to whether the defendants knew or should have
known of its existence on the sidewalk would not
be proper for a jury, it being an undisputed fact
in the case.
In this case now before the court there is no
fact or admission that the rock was placed on the
step by defendants, no evidence of how it got there,
when i't got there, who put it there, or that defen~
dants had or should have had knowledge of its
presence. It did not fly up onto the step. It could
not get on the step unless someone put it there. It
could not jump up from the gravel on the ground
in front of the building. There is no evidence that
it was of the same type and nature as the pea gravel
9
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put in front of the bui'lding, and it was larger than
any of the pea gravel on the apron and in the area
in front of the store.
Defendants respectfully contend that 'the court
did not err to prejudice the plaintiff, and that 'the
instruction as given was correct insofar as plaintiff
is concerned, and plaintiff should not be granted a
new trial; he had his day in court, and had a fair,
impartial trial.
CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully represent that the
trial court shou'ld no't be reversed and no new trial
ordered.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN

BY-------------------------------------------------------ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR.

Attorneys for Responilents
515 Keams Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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